Daniel Cabrera is a Nat!!!

[PatsNats28]

Anyone have any youtube clips or anything of him batting?

[HalfSmokes]

Anyone have any youtube clips or anything of him batting?

I can guarantee no one has footage of him getting a hit
 
http://www.statcorner.com/batterAJAX.php?id=425555&team=BAL&year=2008&leag=A_L

[PANatsFan]

I can guarantee no one has footage of him getting a hit
 
http://www.statcorner.com/batterAJAX.php?id=425555&team=BAL&year=2008&leag=A_L

AZ would say he's better than Dunn since he got a sacrifice

[hammondsnats]

Anyone have any youtube clips or anything of him batting?

it's banned from the internet.  i've been told you have to pay good pictures topdollar to access the video.  and this is coming from one of his best fans, he's terrible at batting.

[Obed_Marsh]

The word is that unless he is throwing the ball, he is not particularly crazy about being close to the ball, which could make for some interesting at bats during his starts for the Nationals -- if indeed he is part of the rotation this coming season. Pitchers infield practice could be interesting this spring as well. Cabrera was no Gold Glove, either, on the mound for the Orioles, and they spent hours trying to work on his fielding, with little success.

If hitting coach Rick Eckstein, though, can get a hit out of Cabrera, that may be the more remarkable accomplishment.

http://washingtontimes.com/weblogs/lovey-land/2008/Dec/30/new-nationals-pitcher-no-babe-ruth/

  I knew he struck out every time but this is just humorous. At least until he starts giving up bunt singles to the pitcher in a Nats uniform.

[HalfSmokes]

from what I've read, he's never really played the field- he was tagged early as a pitcher and has never had to hit until now

[Why Not?]

from what I've read, he's never really played the field- he was tagged early as a pitcher and has never had to hit until now

Cabrera is remarkably un-athletic for someone who makes his living as an athlete. He's strong and fast, but he doesn't have the natural coordination that one would expect. I think that has a lot to do with why he can't throw strikes on a regular basis.

[hammondsnats]

What do you know D-Cab has been kicking butt in the postseason. 

2-1 with a 0.64 ERA.  Two days ago he went 5 innings, 5 hits, 9 k's to pick up the win.  Flores/Hernandez/Belliard are all on the same team.  Flores called the game the other day too.  Good to see the battery mates are working well together.

[PANatsFan]

What do you know D-Cab has been kicking butt in the postseason. 

2-1 with a 0.64 ERA.  Two days ago he went 5 innings, 5 hits, 9 k's to pick up the win.  Flores/Hernandez/Belliard are all on the same team.  Flores called the game the other day too.  Good to see the battery mates are working well together.

If only the Nats were a Winter League team

[hammondsnats]

If only the Nats were a Winter League team

Our roster is pretty much made up of a WL team haha.

Nonetheless, it's still a good sign.

[tomterp]

Not for the "faint of geek".

The Wild Bunch
Granular Blips
by Eric Seidman, Baseball Prospectus

What can be done with the potential-laden hurler who can't control his pitches, who is able to complement his plus-offerings with only random flashes of brilliance, and can just as unexpectedly drop into extended bouts of ineptitude? Because of their promise and raw talent, struggling power pitchers can be repeatedly given shots as reclamation projects as teams try to find a formula for extending those brief flashes into consistent success. Pitching coaches and some analysts might tend to focus solely on the solid outings, meticulously working to isolate the components, either mechanical or psychological, that go missing during their down periods. Very few of these pitchers are able to harness their talents without major adjustments, yet they're still able to command lucrative contracts on the market, based more on their potential upside than on any actual results.

With that in mind, it's time to play everyone's favorite game, "Guess That Pitcher!" Here are the seasonal averages, from 2006-08, of two wild and crazy guys:


Dude    GS   IP   K/9 BB/9  BABIP  NRA  DERA
 A      28  161   8.5  4.6  .298  4.99  5.08
 B      30  177   7.1  5.0  .306  4.99  4.95

Pitcher A seems more apt to strike hitters out and limit hits, while Pitcher B appears moderately more durable. With an NRA mark lower than his DERA, a safe assumption is that Pitcher A performed in front of solid defenders, which helps to explain the difference in BABIP. The differences between the two pitchers are minor, and a case could be made for either as the superior performer. Who then are these mystery men? Pitcher A is Oliver Perez, the 27-year-old lefty most recently seen in a sans-Domino's logo Mets uniform, while Pitcher B is Daniel Cabrera, the 27-year-old righty formerly with the Baltimore Orioles.

Cabrera was non-tendered by the Orioles in December, while Perez hit the market as a free agent in November. Despite their similarities Cabrera quickly signed a one-year, $2.6 million deal with the nearby Nationals, while Perez is angling for something in the vicinity of four years and $44 million from prospective suitors. What is that makes these two so different from one another when teams were free to sign one or the other?

To answer this question, let's take a look at their plate discipline stats over the past three seasons, including frequency of pitches thrown in the strike zone, the rate of swings induced out of the zone, contact on out-of-zone swings, and overall contact rate.


Perez  Zone%  Osw% O-Con% Con%     Cabrera  Zone%  Osw% O-Con% Con%
 2006   52.3  22.3  52.3  79.4      2006     45.7  22.7  48.2  75.6
 2007   49.3  26.1  56.9  78.8      2007     46.9  21.8  55.4  81.9
 2008   51.5  22.2  51.3  79.1      2008     50.6  18.9  69.5  87.6
Additionally, here's what we know as far as the velocity and movement data for their fastballs, sliders, and changeups.


Pitcher FB Vel  FB Move  SL Vel SL Move  CH Vel CH Move
Perez    91.2   7.2/9.2   79.8  4.4/1.6   79.6  2.2/4.7
Cabrera  92.6   7.4/7.7   81.9  3.2/1.8   81.7  0.4/2.1

Cabrera's negative trend as far as hitting the zone and getting strikes virtually nearly leaps off the page. On pitches out of the zone last year, he induced swings just 18.9 percent of the time, the lowest such rate of anyone in the big leagues. Contact on these pitches rose exponentially, which necessitated a higher zone frequency and increased his overall contact rate to the fourth-highest in baseball. In contrast, Perez stayed relatively consistent in these metrics, with his marks hovering around average. You can also see that Oliver throws his pitches with slightly less velocity, but notably more movement. Both of the tables above conform to Cabrera's steady decline in performance from 2006-08, and also point to Perez as the more sound investment, but another question of interest remains: What separates this type of pitcher, with their high-level potential, inconsistent control, and frustrating results, from the rest of the league?

Over the past three seasons, the league-average rate for pitches thrown within the strike zone was 52 percent. In the same span, Cabrera threw 48 percent of his pitches in the zone, while Perez was at 50 percent; both are below-average marks, but not nearly as much as you'd expect. I've long held the theory that what wild pitchers do is not nearly as important as when they do it; that pitchers like Cabrera and Perez will feature overall velocity, movement, and zone percentages that are similar to those of the non-wild, and that the actual differences will surface in a much more granular way, such as in selected ball-strike counts, or certain base-running situations.

After checking the more obvious aspects of their pitching metrics, I wanted to take a closer look to determine whether or not their pitches lacked sufficient movement before ruling out any of the overall data. Running a league-wide comparison produced the following results:

Perez Fastball Movement Comps: Jake Peavy, Javier Vazquez, Randy Wolf
Perez Slider Movement Comps: Brian Fuentes, Pedro Feliciano
Cabrera Fastball Movement Comps: Josh Beckett, Felix Hernandez
Cabrera Slider Movement Comps: John Smoltz, Aaron Harang, Jeremy Guthrie

There are no red flags here, with their primary offerings—featuring movement similar to that of some elite pitchers, as well as similar velocities and zone percentages—failing to expose any revelations in the overall data. Diving deep into specific situations, I first calculated the average percentage of pitches thrown in a somewhat generous strike zone in each of the 12 ball-strike counts for the entire league. I repeated the process for both Cabrera and Perez, revealing a few interesting tells:


Count   MLB Perez Cabrera
 0-0   60.5  56.5  58.9
 0-1   52.3  52.3  49.1
 0-2   37.1  49.7  33.3
 1-0   61.7  58.5  55.9
 1-1   57.3  54.6  51.4
 1-2   45.6  52.2  45.7
 2-0   63.3  63.2  68.6
 2-1   63.9  64.4  58.6
 2-2   55.1  57.9  51.7
 3-0   59.5  63.6  63.9
 3-1   67.8  57.6  60.7
 3-2   64.5  60.9  58.9

Perez only strayed from the average on 0-2, 1-2, and 3-1 counts. Of the two counts that favor pitchers, Perez threw a percentage in the zone well above the league average, but in the hitter's count his percentage was a great deal below average. The results in the 0-2 count are particularly compelling, given that his 49.7 percent zone frequency dwarfed the 37.1 percent league average. Probing my database for starting pitchers with similar 0-2 zone percentages who had a minimum of 60 such counts produced the following list:

Olsen     Marlins   56.3
Wakefield Red Sox   55.1
Rasner    Yankees   53.1
Buchholz  Red Sox   51.7
Morton    Braves    50.8
Perez     Mets      49.7

Perez ranked sixth among all starters in this area, and he and his colleagues all posted FIPs in the same vicinity. Perhaps Ollie is not fully confident in his off-speed pitches, or fears that a wasted pitch might lead to a lost hitter, but throwing half of your pitches in the zone in such a situation is bound to result in the occasional mistake. The lower zone percentage in 3-1 counts is actually more understandable for a supposedly wild pitcher. Merely arriving at a three-ball count could suggest that he lacks his "stuff" when most of those plate appearances occur. Whereas his 0-2 and 1-2 zone discrepancies may deal more with his decision-making, the results on 3-1 are more likely just out of his control (pun intended).

Cabrera also struggles in these counts, and the only other situation in which Cabrera deviated from the average was in the ever-important 1-1 count. When he found himself in a position to either shift the advantage firmly in his favor or hand it right back to the hitter, Cabrera struggled to locate his pitches. More often than the vast majority of pitchers in the league, he went from 1-1 to 2-1. With his ability to induce out-of-zone swings dwindling over the last few years, and in situations where the count favors the hitter, Cabrera would either have to throw his fastball in the zone and be victimized by contact, or he'd end up in an even more dangerous 3-1 count.

How about their stats with or without runners on base? Pitching out of the stretch can adversely affect mechanics, grips, and pitching motion. Here are the figures for overall zone percentages, fastball velocities, and fastball movement with the bases empty, with a runner on first base, and with runners in scoring position:


Perez   Zone%  FB Vel FB Move      Cabrera Zone%  FB Vel FB Move
Empty    54.1    91.3  7.2/9.4     Empty    54.4    93.1  7.6/7.9
1B Only  50.8    90.5  7.3/9.1     1B Only  50.2    92.5  7.5/7.7
RISP     50.4    91.5  7.4/8.9     RISP     47.4    92.9  7.0/7.9

As runners moved up on the basepaths, Perez saw a steady increase in the tail of his fastball, despite a drop-off in vertical movement at each juncture. Cabrera sustained the horizontal movement of his fastball with the bases empty or runners on first base, but lost a half-inch with runners in scoring position, while his vertical movement was not affected. The league-average zone percentages were 56.1 with the bases empty, 52.8 with runners on first, and 51.3 with runners in scoring position. Only Cabrera's zone percentage with RISP stands out; he missed the zone more often than not in these situations, but induced so few swings that an added ball to the count seemed like a sure thing. He was forced to come into the zone on hitters when behind in the count, relying heavily on a fastball that had lost two miles per hour from the previous season.

If Cabrera wants to reverse the downward trend in his statistics and make the Orioles regret their decision to let him go, he needs to re-establish the off-speed portion of his repertoire. A reliever with a 93 mph fastball might be able to get away with throwing over fastballs over 82 percent of the time, but a starter needs more variety to sustain success. The problem, however, is that I can't possibly be the first person to come up with such a suggestion. The same goes for a possible solution for Perez: to trust his pitches more, and not be afraid to throw a waste pitch every now and then. At the major league level, these two have probably received this kind of advice ad nauseum.

At this stage in their careers, Perez appears to be the better pitcher, but not by nearly as wide a margin as some might think. At over $10 million per season for three or more years, the Mets would be investing a pretty penny in the possibility that a seven-year veteran who has yet to establish any semblance of consistency will suddenly turn a corner. While an improvement like this is not unheard of, Cabrera's one-year, $2.6 million deal certainly carries much less risk should his struggles persist. Pitchers like Cabrera and Perez do not differ that much from the rest of the league outside of a few granular instances. Regardless of how easy it may seem for either to be able to improve their results in these situations, no guarantee exists that such improvements will take place... ever. Yet each will be given additional opportunities, accompanied by every suggestion in the book. Daniel Cabrera and Oliver Perez may one day figure things out, but they also might play major league baseball for the next decade before anyone realizes that fulfilling their promise was never within their control.

[tomterp]

BP's Christina Kahrl on mostly the Cabrera signing.

Released RHP Jesus Colome, but subsequently re-signed him to a minor league contract with a spring training NRI. [12/10]
Agreed to terms with OF-L Willie Harris on a two-year, $3 million contract; non-tendered RHP Tim Redding. [12/12]
Signed RHP Daniel Cabrera to a one-year, $2.6 million contact. [12/29]


While Cabrera's more talented in terms of what he can do in front of a speed gun than your usual Jim Bowden retreading attempt, he lacks even the sporadic effectiveness that made Esteban Loaiza or Jimmy Haynes or even Ryan Drese appealing in that market segment defined by !"gun-to-my-head, sure, I'll give him a shot." While you can hope that Cabrera's going to be able to reverse his fortunes by moving to the easier league and away from the beasts of the AL East, how much easier, really, is life going to be pitching in the unbalanced schedule against the four better ballclubs of the NL East? Ditching the DH or no, life does not get easier when you're left picking between four good opposing lineups with few holes among your divisional opponents. As bad as last season's numbers are, the basic back-of-the-baseball-card numbers don't give the depths of the horror justice: sure, the man walked 10.4 percent of all hitters he faced last season, but he also almost won the triple crown of the less-recognized Nolan Ryan suite of unhappy pitching stats, leading the major leagues in hit batsmen with 18, finishing two back of the MLB leader in wild pitches (but leading the AL with 15), and tied for third in stolen bases allowed while witnessing 27 of 31 attempts succeed. That's extra baserunners and extra bases that make a bad pitcher worse.

We can argue over whether those represent symptoms or betray a more basic inability, certainly. After all, whether we're talking Ryan or Rick Vaughn, you can endure the goofy statistical feats as long as the guy's getting people out at home plate, and Cabrera simply hasn't of late. Add in the problems that Eric Seidman identified in today's article about Cabrera's extreme difficulty getting swing-and-miss outcomes that goes with his losing the ability to throw breaking stuff consistently or well, and as talented as Cabrera has been, there comes a point where you have to ask the guy to stop bonking about already and just deliver. Increasingly, that's looking more and more unlikely for Cabrera, so while the money's relatively modest (even if it really took "outbidding the Mets and Pirates," and what does that say about those team's needs?), the outcome's not really all that promising, and if he does deliver, where does that leave you? Either throwing much more money at an inconsistent commodity for a subsequent extension, or if he's really pitched so well as, say, Oliver Perez, that he's in the territory of your being able to safely offer him arbitration en route to his departure for considerably more money than you probably should pay. Even then, given this organization's management practices, where does an additional pick—assuming Cabrera even earns that sort of status, perhaps no sure thing after his recent suckitude—leave a Nationals franchise that screwed up getting top pick Aaron Crow under contract last summer? Those sorts of considerations might encourage you to think that Bowden might instead enter into this relationship gunning to simply stock his rotation and potentially flip Cabrera at the deadline for goodies if the wild man settles down, but how much faith can you really place in Bowden being able to swing that when he's come up short on deadline day the last few seasons?

Where I was initially willing to be generous and see Bowden as an aggressive mover and shaker perched atop a player development program that had done pretty well at keeping the system stocked, his long-term investments in players like Austin Kearns and Cristian Guzman (or Dmitri Young) and more speaks ill of his judgment as far as big-league talent, and the farm system's track record for generating talent is getting worse on his watch instead of better. When you get bad at the big and little things, and you're left with trying to hang your hat on minor success stories like getting some good work out of a guy like Harris, you really need to ask whether the real problem was the decision to retread Bowden when no other team was likely to ever make the attempt after his long track record of decline and failure in Cincinnati.

Christina Kahrl is an author of Baseball Prospectus. You can contact Christina by clicking here or click here to see Christina's other articles.

     

[The Chief]

Those of you wondering where unrelated discussion went know where to look.  Jesus guys, get a freaking grip.

[fan]

Those of you wondering where unrelated discussion went know where to look.  Jesus guys, get a freaking grip.

Kudos.

[blue911]

Those of you wondering where unrelated discussion went know where to look.  Jesus guys, get a freaking grip.

[tomterp]

Risking Daniel
The New Nat, Hot or Not?
by Eric Seidman, Baseball Prospectus

Low-risk, high-reward deals are built upon short commitments at low cost, and they're usually given to players with upside, players who may have underperformed in recent seasons but are known to have been successful in the past, or those who are prone to injury and at risk of missing significant time. The underlying hope is that such players will turn a corner or experience a career renaissance, producing at a level far exceeding expectations. Relative to dollars spent per win, it doesn't require much production for one of these players to earn his keep, and by limiting the guarantee of a roster spot to no more than one season and paying a relatively small stipend for his services, teams can avoid getting burned should their addition suddenly start pitching like Dan Kolb or developing the health habits of Mark Prior. The perfect example of a low-risk, high-reward deal in 2008 saw Kyle Lohse sign a one-year, $4.25 million contract with the Cardinals. A popular pick to be this season's low-risk success is Daniel Cabrera, but to expand on a subject I touched on last week, he actually carries much more risk than meets the eye.

The Orioles non-tendered Cabrera back in December, and within weeks at least 11 suitors had reportedly lined up. Apparently, close to one third of the league felt that they could turn the 27-year-old Cabrera, who has yet to figure out the proper application of his abilities, into an effective pitcher. Last week, I compared Cabrera to Oliver Perez, another 27-year-old power pitcher, showing that their 2006-08 statistics were very similar. A three-year average does not tell the entire story for Cabrera, however, since his performance has declined in several key statistics since 2006. Cabrera's ability to induce swings on pitches out of the zone fell from slightly below average to league-worst in 2008, compounded by an almost exponential increase in the rate of contact made with these outside pitches. In turn, his overall contact rate ranked fourth highest in the sport last season. Hardly anyone swung at his outside pitches, but when they did, they made plenty of contact.


Year   GS    IP   K/9  BB/9  HR/9   DERA
2006   26   148   9.6   6.3   0.7   4.44
2007   34   204   7.3   4.6   1.1   5.26
2008   30   180   4.8   4.4   1.2    5.05

Even with half as many strikeouts per nine innings and double the home-run rate from the 2006 season, Cabrera remained very durable, averaging six innings per start in '08. The durability actually influenced the Orioles decision to cut him loose; with such a drastic drop-off in performance, velocity, and movement, as well as an elbow injury that was reported in September, Cabrera did not seem worthy of the $5-6 million that his durability and service time might have merited in arbitration. The elbow injury may not have surfaced until the end of the season, but his numbers began falling off the charts much sooner.


Period      GS  IP/GS  K/9  BB/9   RA/9
4/2 - 4/28   6   6.2   5.1   5.1   4.14
5/3 - 5/30   6   7.2   4.8   2.3   3.14
6/4 - 7/ 2   6   6.4   5.2   3.1   5.87
7/8 - 8/ 3   6   5.6   5.3   5.6   8.02
8/9 - 9/13   6   4.7   2.9   7.1   7.07

Cabrera’s season started off quite nicely, with a 3.60 ERA in 12 starts, averaging a 54 Game Score over that stretch. Around the beginning of June he reportedly began to tinker with his delivery, an act he was all too familiar with, having altered his pitching motion the year before to try to control the opposing running game. Even when he experienced success, however, what comes off as striking is that at no point throughout the 2008 season did his strikeout rate resemble those of the previous last few years. The difference can largely be attributed to his steadily declining plate discipline metrics. His repertoire featured very comparable velocities and movements to those from the 2007 season, but he struggled to induce outside swings. When hitters did decide to swing, they made contact, either by fouling the pitch off or putting it in play. Finesse pitchers are the breed that usually lacks a put-away pitch, but Cabrera seemed to fit that mold even with an electric fastball. When his secondary offerings weren't working, it seems that Cabrera decided to almost exclusively use the heater. Of course, what we don't know is whether or not his injury could have been more serious than reported, hindering his ability to even throw the breaking pitches.

In June he reportedly began to tinker with his delivery, and whether or not his downfall was the direct result of his modified windup, it's quite apparent that from June 4 to September 13 he looked like a completely different pitcher. Cabrera's strikeout rate, already down, dropped precipitously at the tail end of the year, while his walk rate merely got worse and worse. His durability faded, and when he did toe the rubber, opposing lineups all hit like Manny Ramirez; those final six starts are astoundingly bad. With such a sharp decline, it might be expected that his velocity and movement had followed a similar pattern.


Period        FB% Velocity   Movement
4/2 - 4/28   65.4   93.9      7.5/9.4
5/3 - 5/30   87.1   93.3      8.5/7.8
6/4 - 7/ 2   80.3   93.3      7.4/8.2
7/8 - 8/ 3   77.4   92.4      7.4/6.9
8/9 - 9/13   76.8   91.1      6.1/7.4

Throughout April, Cabrera mixed his pitches relatively well while also averaging around 94 mph with the heater, and delivering the pitch with great tailing action and a solid rise. For whatever reason, in May he began to rely too much on his fastball, and it ended up being his most successful month. The tail on Cabrera's fastball, which correlates to ground balls, proved to be at its best, and his velocity held near 93 mph. The problem is, hitters don't have to think much when a pitcher is only throwing one pitch. Cabrera began to tinker with his delivery after these 12 starts, while throwing close to 80 percent fastballs. Hitters simply stopped swinging at pitches out of the zone, necessitating a higher frequency of pitches in the actual strike zone.

During the final three months of the season, Cabrera's velocity and movement both fell into oblivion, but his frequency experienced no more than a minimal decrease. He continued to throw the fastball a high percentage of the time, more often than not in the strike zone. A pitcher can get away with throwing strikes with a 93 mph fastball, but Cabrera's loss of velocity and his failure to make appropriate adjustments were a disaster.

In his final start on September 13, Cabrera's fastball averaged just 89.6 mph with 4.6 inches of horizontal of movement, 46 percent less than the average fastball tail exhibited in his stellar May starts. The Orioles stated that Cabrera’s sprained elbow involve no structural damage, but according to Will Carroll, there simply is not much else to sprain in the elbow outside of the ulnar collateral ligament; the UCL is what requires fixing in the ever popular Tommy John surgery. The issue then becomes a question of how significant this sprain was and is; it's probably significant that the Orioles elected to cut ties with him. The Nationals felt the opposite, perhaps anticipating that Cabrera’s elbow can hold up over an entire season.

His weighted mean PECOTA projection calls for a return to his 2007 marks, though with a much-improved home-run rate and a 4.31 ERA in 138 innings with 2.1 WARP, such performance would easily make Cabrera worth the $2.6 million in his contract. The Nationals are gambling that his elbow will hold up for the entire season. While the Nats have little to lose should Cabrera go down, his career may veer down a vastly different road depending on the outcome of this season. Power pitchers with sometimes electric fastballs will always garner multiple reclamation project-type chances, but elbow surgery could impact the extent to which they involve guaranteed contracts as opposed to non-roster opportunities. Last week I suggested that Cabrera could spend 10 years in the major leagues before anyone realizes that his potential will always exceed his actual results. The 2009 season may be virtually meaningless to the Washington Nationals franchise, but it means an awful lot to Cabrera.

[hammondsnats]

TT, as much crap you get for posting these and VORP write-ups/analysis, I really appreciate it.  Always makes for good reading.

[Nat of the Living Dead]

TT, as much crap you get for posting these and VORP write-ups/analysis, I really appreciate it.  Always makes for good reading.

Are you crapting me? Those pages of jargon remind me of the days of falling asleep in a Radford Stat course. And like the course, they don't really mean squat!

[tomterp]

Are you crapting me? Those pages of jargon remind me of the days of falling asleep in a Radford Stat course. And like the course, they don't really mean squat!

How can anybody fall asleep in a stats class?        :stupid:  Stats classes were GREAT!   

[Nat of the Living Dead]

How can anybody fall asleep in a stats class?        :stupid:  Stats classes were GREAT!  

[tomterp]

This guy slept through his statistics class too.

[hammondsnats]

I read 'em.  I enjoy 'em.  It's baseball.

[blue911]

This guy slept through his statistics class too.

Grandpa Terp!