French author Jules Roy suggests Admiral Radford discussed with the French the possibility of using nuclear weapons in support of the French garrison.[84] Moreover, John Foster Dulles reportedly mentioned the possibility of lending atomic bombs to the French for use at Dien Bien Phu,[85] and a similar source claims then British Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden was aware of the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in that region.[86]

there's a quote from the post obit about him knowing he could beat the French in Paris and a Marine General commenting very early on the same may be true of the Americans in Washington. There is only so long a country is willing to keep troops in the field taking casualties with no end in sight.

The wiki on dien bien phu compares it to Khe Sanh and to a prior french air drop supplied garrisoning victory.  Giap learned from the earlier loss about the importance of positioning his artillery and getting a heavy AA presence.  In the earlier battle, the french controlled the high ground and Giap used frontal assaults.  The theory was that DBP could disrupt Viet Minh operationis in Laos, another French area.  IT was set up as a deep forward base in the northwest. however, Dien Bien Phu was in the bottom of a valley.  The french did not realize how much artillery and anti-aircraft guns were up in the surrounding hills.  The french artillery commander committed suicide the first night of the battle when he realized what a mistake he made.  the artillery knocked out HQ bunkers in a couple of positions and made the air strip unusable. Still, the Viet Minh took more casualties in the early stages of the battle than the french forces.  however, the inability of the french, with covert US help, to resupply the troops and provide effective air support let Giap knock off the french strong points one by one. 

It's not clear whether Khe Sanh was an attempt to distract the US from the main Tet offensive or whether Giap thought he could pull off another Dien Bein Phu.  Khe Sanh was another forward base, it was much closer to US bases so resupply was simpler and in greater quantity.  Also, air support was much more effective, and it was on the high ground.  Truly an amazing, courageous effort by the marines, air cavalry, and other units involved.

As awful as it surely must have been at Khe Sanh, the Americans never lost use of the airfield (and also had helicopters), plus could call in overpowering air and artillery support. 

The French were basically freaked when the airfield was no longer usable.  I can only imagine what thoughts were going through the heads of the paras as they jumped into that crapshow knowing that there was no hope of evacuation or escape. 

But even Khe Sanh probably did what it was supposed to do as far as Giap was concerned - be a decoy operation that distracted Westmoreland from taking much note of the VC/NVA buildup all around the south that culminated in the Tet offensive.  I think the base was abandoned shortly after the siege was broken. 

We went to Khe Sanh a couple of years ago...the place is bleak and pretty much featureless with low hills off in the distance around it.  There are no reminders of what went down there in '68 other than some rusting pieces of the airstrip, and old derelict helicopter or two, a rusting tank, and a crappy museum full of over-the-top propaganda.

http://www.businessinsider.com/walker-greentree-ninjas-seals-mcraven-jsoc-2013-10#ixzz2gqWP2QMu

The age old question: Is a Navy SEAL quiter than a ninja?

I never quite understood the compulsion to avoid soviets.  If they get in the way, too bad.

this. Avoiding those targets cost us how many American air crew?

so the Sam sites get taken out, lets say best case we win, then what? 20 or 30 years as an occupying power in a country that doesnt want you, taking constant casualties.there never was an end game in that war, any success would have been fleeting